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Is the Constitutional Court Fanning the Flames of Potential Unrest? A Review of Recent 
Political Cases1 
O’Brien Kaaba,2 Felicity Kayumba Kalunga,3 and Pamela Towela Sambo4 
 
Facts 
On 14 May 2021, the Constitutional Court of Zambia (ConCourt) delivered a ruling in the case 
where Charles Mathias Zulu5 had requested interpretation of Article 70 (1)(d) of the 
Constitution of Zambia as it relates to an aspirant Member of Parliament (MP) having obtained 
a Grade twelve certificate or its equivalent, as the minimum academic qualification. The 
ConCourt delivered a five-page ruling dismissing the case on the ground that the interpretation 
of Article 71(1)(d) of the Constitution was well settled in its earlier decision in Bizwayo Newton 
Nkunika v Lawrence Nyirenda and Another (2019/CCZ/005), delivered on 10 March 2021.  
Without delving into the merits of the Zulu case, we are deeply concerned about the 
impoverished character of this ruling which, when analysed in the context of some recent 
decisions and actions of the ConCourt in politically inclined cases, establishes a disturbing 
pattern which is an affront to constitutionalism, rule of law and access to justice in Zambia. We 
argue that the recent decisions and actions of the ConCourt in relation to most constitutional 
and political cases, have the potential to cause political unrest. This is so because public 
confidence in the capacity of the ConCourt to dispense justice in political problems of a 
constitutional nature, is likely to be diminished. We demonstrate this view by reviewing at least 
four recent constitutional and political cases which the ConCourt has settled, but against the 
principles of constitutionalism, rule of law and access to justice.    
 
Significance 
We start by unpacking the ruling in the Zulu case. After reproducing the questions raised by 
the applicants and the preliminary issues by the Attorney General, the ConCourt tersely held: 
‘We have considered the issues raised in the Motion, the affidavit evidence by both sides and 
the skeleton arguments. We have also considered the oral submissions made during the hearing. 
We agree that the interpretation of Article 70(1)(d) of the Constitution was well settled in the 
case of Bizwayo Newton Nkunika v Lawrence Nyirenda and Another.’6  
From that premise, the ConCourt renders its decision thus: ‘Accordingly, we find merit in the 
first preliminary issue. Given our position regarding the first preliminary issue, the second 
preliminary issue, therefore, falls away.’7 How is this ruling an act of judging when the judges 
have not analysed anything? The Supreme Court of Zambia, in the case, Minister of Home 
Affairs and Attorney General v Lee Habasonde (2007) ZR 207 and several other cases, has 
given guidance on the minimum standard expected of every judicial decision: ‘Every judgment 
must reveal a review of evidence, where applicable, a summary of the arguments and 
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submissions, if made, findings of fact, the reasoning of the court on the facts and the application 
of the law and authorities if any, to the facts.’ 
The retired Nigerian Supreme Court judge, Odemwengie Uwaifo, beautifully summed the 
nature of court decisions as follows: ‘a judge should not just write his judgment. He must let it 
appear he made it with a clear commitment to convince. That must be demonstrated by the 
quality of its analysis and transparency. An unconvincing judgment is like a song rendered in 
awkward decibel: it can neither entertain nor can it be danced to.’8  
We cannot find these minimum standards of writing court decisions in the decision reached by 
the ConCourt in the Zulu case. At the very least, it was expected that the ConCourt would have 
engaged with the principles of law on the concept of res judicata and show, based on the facts 
of the Zulu case, how the concept was applied and upheld in this particular case. To succeed, 
the party relying on res judicata must show that the cause of action is the same or that the 
claimant had an opportunity to recover from the first action what they are seeking in the second, 
but for their own fault. The ConCourt failed to do so by not rendering a reasoned ruling, in line 
with the Supreme Court guidance we have alluded to. As a matter of emphasis, the ConCourt 
was obliged to explain to both the Applicant and the general public how it interpreted Article 
70(1)(d) of the Constitution with regard to the specific question posed by the Applicant, that 
is,  whether tertiary qualifications which are not equivalent to a Grade 12 Certificate would be 
considered separately, the Grade 12 Certificate and its equivalent being the minimum 
requirement.  
The second case we wish to highlight is Bampi Aubrey Kapalasa and Joseph Busenga v The 
Attorney General 2021/CCZ/011/0014 which was filed into the Concourt on 13 April 2021. 
The gist of the Petitioners’ claim was for the ConCourt to ‘clarify if President Edgar Chagwa 
Lungu is eligible to contest the 2021 Presidential Elections.’ The ConCourt dismissed the 
application with regard to the eligibility question by upholding a preliminary issue raised by 
the Attorney General. According to the Attorney General, the issues raised by the Petitioners 
were res judicata on account of the ConCourt’s controversial 2018 judgment in Daniel Pule 
and Others v The Attorney General and Others. The matter was dismissed on 5 May 2021 and 
the Concourt reserved its ruling to a later date. The written ruling was subsequently delivered 
on 18 May 2021, a day after President Lungu had successfully filed his nomination with the 
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ).  
In its ruling, the ConCourt changed the preliminary issue raised by the Attorney General from 
the matter being res judicata and functus officio to it being an abuse of the process of court. 
This peculiar method of constitutional adjudication whereby an adjudicator substitutes parties’ 
claims, which we also saw in the ConCourt’s judgment in Daniel Pule, remains under active 
legal inquiry. The ConCourt then proceeded to extensively quote from its judgment in the Pule 
case in an effort to demonstrate that it had answered the question posed by the Petitioners. The 
ConCourt then held: ‘it was conclusively determined (in the Pule judgment) that the term of 
office that spanned a period from 25 January 2015 to 13 September 2016 did not constitute a 
term for the purposes of Article 106(3) as read together with Article 106(6) of the Constitution. 
It follows that the same cannot be counted as a term for the purposes of Article 106(3) of the 
Constitution.’  
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The import of this finding is that the Pule judgment is altered by the ConCourt, by linking the 
period said to not constitute a full term to Article 106(3). In so doing, the ConCourt, whilst still 
evading the specific question in relation to President Lungu, is effectively admitting that this 
recurring legal and constitutional question was not answered exhaustively in the Pule judgment 
or alternatively, that the answer remains unclear. This could possibly explain the ConCourt’s 
decision compelling Kapalasa and Busenga to prosecute the Petition which the Petitioners 
themselves had otherwise sought to withdraw. This is another curious decision where a written 
ruling was not rendered, thereby inviting speculation in relation to the ConCourt’s motivation 
for expending its resources on a matter that it deemed to be an abuse of the process of court 
and against the wishes of the Petitioners.  
Consequently, this trend of issuing rulings with inadequately articulated reasons erodes the 
public confidence in the judiciary. The public should be able to see that justice has been done 
thereby reinforcing public confidence in the judicial system. Reasoned decisions also motivate 
confidence and respect in the technical competence and qualifications of judges. On the whole, 
a judgment without reason lacks both legal and moral force to convince a losing litigant to 
accept the outcome of the decision. As constitutional law scholar Koos Malan has argued, it is 
‘through their legal knowledge, wisdom and reasoned decision-making [that] they earn respect 
and high esteem and command moral authority. That respect is the source of the court’s moral 
power.’9 It is therefore not surprising that in order to command respect, the ConCourt in the 
Kapalasa and Busenga v. Attorney General ruling has dedicated two entire paragraphs towards 
demanding respect, at the expense of articulating a well - reasoned decision, which in turn 
would naturally and effortlessly, assert the superiority and importance of the ConCourt in 
Zambia.  
The third case we wish to highlight is the Petition by Chapter One Foundation (COF)10 
challenging the decision by the ECZ to discard the valid and lawfully established voters’ 
register and conduct fresh registration of voters for the 2021 elections within a period of 30 
days. This decision by ECZ was subject to three legal challenges, including two judicial review 
applications in the High Court which were not heard on account of this ConCourt matter.  
COF commenced this public interest case on 3 August 2020 seeking two reliefs: an order 
directing ECZ to conduct continuous voter registration and another directing the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to conduct mobile issuance of National Registration Cards throughout the 
country. COF amended its process on 1 October 2020 after ECZ announced its decision to 
abolish the existing voter register to include a third relief, ‘a declaration that ECZ’s decision 
and intention to disallow currently registered voters from voting in the 2021 general election 
and future elections is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.’ To date, the ConCourt 
has not heard this matter, notwithstanding that its non-resolution has now had the actual effect 
of disenfranchising tens of thousands of voters without legal recourse.  
What is curious about this case is the inordinate delay in hearing the matter and giving a timely 
remedy which could have prevented many Zambians from being disenfranchised. Admittedly, 
timeous resolution of disputes is a key principle of access to justice which is expressed in 
Article 118(2)(b) of the Constitution of Zambia as follows: ‘justice shall not be delayed.’  
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The ECZ having completed the fresh registration of voters between 9 November and 20 
December 2020 (almost six weeks after COF requested the order of invalidity), any decision 
that the ConCourt may render on this matter will be moot. This leaves citizens with a sense of 
hopelessness in the capacity of the ConCourt to give effective remedies to constitutional 
challenges. Compared to the urgency given to subsequent cases, such as the Kapalasa and 
Busenga case (which we have already considered above) and the John Sangwa case (which we 
consider below), one would not be faulted for thinking that the ConCourt is more preoccupied 
with furthering the political interests of the elites, whilst denying access to justice to the 
ordinary people from whom they derive judicial authority. At this juncture, we underscore the 
view that respect for any court emanates from that court’s own penchant for unambiguously 
upholding the law, irrespective of who is affected. 
The final case we evaluate is the Petition filed by John Sangwa, SC on 4 May 202111 which 
sought an order to compel the ECZ to amend the Affidavit which accompanies the application 
for nomination of presidential candidates to include the qualifications under Article 106(3) of 
the Constitution. The Attorney General and another interested party, Lewis Mosho joined the 
proceedings and opposed the Petition. The Petitioner objected to the joinder of the Attorney 
General on ground that the action undermined the independence of the ECZ. Further, the 
Petitioner objected to Mosho’s application on grounds that Mosho lacked the requisite standing 
to raise the issues raised as an interested party.   
Yet again, the ConCourt dismissed the Petition with costs on 5 May 2021, and without 
delivering a written or reasoned ruling for the dismissal. Without speculating on the reasons 
for dismissing such a profound matter, in the absence of a reasoned ruling, we are shockedby 
the subsequent order for costs in this constitutional matter. Moreover, it is not clear if this order 
for costs covers both the Attorney General and the intervening party who joined the 
proceedings at their own instance. If media reports doing the rounds are anything to go by, the 
Attorney General and the interested party have since issued a demand for the respective 
colossal sums of K5 million and K3 million in costs.  
Challenging the constitutionality of a practice or law is an exercise of a fundamental 
constitutional entitlement and duty according to Article 2 (a) and (b) as read with several other 
provisions of the Constitution. This duty in defence of the Constitution should not carry any 
risk of costs. The importance of this inviolable principle was forcefully stated by the Supreme 
Court in Zambia in the case of Anderson Kambela Mazoka and Others v Levy Patrick 
Mwanawasa and Others (2005) ZR 138 as follows: ‘As we have always said on costs in matters 
of this nature, it is in the interest of the proper function of our democracy that challenges to the 
election of the president, which are permitted by the Constitution and which are not frivolous 
should not be inhibited by unwarranted condemnation in costs.’ That the court did not render 
a ruling makes it impossible to decipher exactly how the Petition filed by Sangwa can 
reasonably be considered frivolous considering that it raised a novel, pertinent and fundamental 
constitutional question, falling within the legal mandate of the ConCourt. 
Undoubtedly, this condemnation of Sangwa to costs has also exposed the ConCourt’s 
deficiency in comparative research, which has led to the churning out of legally impoverished 
judgments, lacking in intellectual candour and depth. The South African Constitutional Court, 
for example, in the case of Trustees for the Time Being of the Biowatch Trust v Registrar 
Genetic (2009), has elaborated a three-fold rationale for ordinarily not ordering costs in 
constitutional matters.  First, it diminishes the chilling effect that adverse costs orders can have 
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on parties asserting constitutional rights and might have the effect of citizens foregoing 
meritorious constitutional claims. Secondly, constitutional litigation, regardless of the 
outcome, might bear not only on the interests of litigants directly involved in a matter, but may 
also have consequences on the rights of others similarly situated. Thirdly, it is the state that 
bears primary responsibility for ensuring that both the law and state conduct are consistent with 
the constitution and the law. The fact that the ConCourt did not find in favour of a litigant is 
not sufficient warrant to order costs. The ConCourt must take a broader look at matters raised 
and consider how a costs order may hinder or promote the advancement of justice. Courts in 
Lesotho have equally taken the South African approach. Writing for the unanimous Lesotho 
Court of Appeal, Justice Philip Musonda (who, by the way, is a retired judge of the Zambian 
Supreme Court), held that in constitutional matters, even if a litigant laboured under the 
misconception that they had a good case, that alone is not sufficient ground for the court to 
order costs when the case is lost (see the cases of Kananelo Mosito and Others v Ohalehang 
and Others (2018) and The President of the Court of Appeal v The Prime Minister (2013)). 
An additional, and perhaps more compelling reason for not ordinarily condemning public 
interest litigants to costs, is that allowing aggrieved parties to seek relief in the courts without 
risking being condemned to costs potentially opens the courts widely to the people. As 
distinguished Ghanaian constitutional law scholar, Kwasi Prempeh put it, it allows judges to 
‘take the courts to the people.’12 In effect, this would ensure that courts become the commonly 
used avenues for resolution of contested democratic claims as opposed to resorting to street 
violence or other self-help means. As opined in this article, the approach taken by the 
Constitutional Court of Zambia could potentially be encouraging people to take their 
constitutional and political contests to the streets, thereby fanning flames of unrest that may, 
regrettably, be difficult to quench. 
In the final analysis, the cases we have discussed in this article raise fundamental questions 
about access to justice. Inefficient delivery of judgments, issuance of unreasoned or thinly 
reasoned rulings, inordinate delay in hearing matters, and awarding of unwarranted costs in 
public interest matters all militate against access to justice. Access to justice is important in 
maintaining law and order and promoting the rule of law. As US Supreme Court Judge, 
Stevens, stated in Bush v Gore 531 US 98 (2000), ‘It is confidence in the men and women who 
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.’ Where institutions 
fail, the public may resort to self-help mechanisms as a means to exercise their sovereign power 
under the Constitution which may negatively affect the consolidation of democracy. The 
warning of Julius Nyerere, first President of Tanzania seems more relevant to the Constitutional 
Court of Zambia today than ever before: unless judges do their work properly, ‘none of the 
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